Inverse Campaigning
提出“反向竞选”概念，指以执政为目标的政党主动公开其政策会损害部分选民利益的行为，分析了这种策略如何影响政策设计、耗散政党租金并导致效率损失。
It can be advantageous for an ‘office motivated’ party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties’ rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose a lot and do not benefit small groups of voters who gain a lot.