Nash as an Organizing Principle in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
通过实验研究信息条件对公共物品自愿供给的影响，发现完全信息并未显著改变高于均衡的贡献水平，且非零贡献并非向边界均衡收敛的过渡性错误。
Abstract Experiments are reported that add to the growing literature on the voluntary provision of public goods. Information conditions are manipulated to address whether early findings of above-equilibrium contributions to a public good are a result of complete information regarding the symmetry of the game. No significant information effect was found. Further, by examining designs with an interior Nash equilibrium, this research suggests that the nonzero contributions observed in the previous dominant strategy environments, where the prediction was a zero level of provision of the public good, were not simply transitional errors as the system converged to a boundary equilibrium.