Shadow Trading
研究公司内部人是否利用私有信息在经济关联企业（如商业伙伴和竞争对手）中进行交易以规避内幕交易限制，发现这种“影子交易”普遍存在且监管执法和外部就业机会变化会影响其程度。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether corporate insiders attempt to circumvent insider trading restrictions by using their private information to facilitate trading in economically linked firms, a phenomenon we call “shadow trading.” Using measures of informed trading to proxy for shadow trading, we find increased levels of informed trading among business partners and competitors before a firm releases private information. To rule out alternative explanations, we examine two shocks to insiders' incentives to engage in shadow trading: high-profile regulatory enforcement against conventional insider trading, and staggered changes to their outside employment opportunities. Finally, we document attenuated levels of informed trading among business partners and competitors when firms prohibit shadow trading. Overall, we provide evidence that shadow trading is an undocumented and widespread mechanism that insiders use to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D4; G14; K22.