Platform Ownership
构建了买卖双方在平台上交易的理论框架，比较不同平台所有权结构的影响。研究发现，当双边网络效应强时，垄断所有权比分散所有权更能促进交易，且社会更优；允许现有所有者排除潜在进入者会损害买家但可能提高福利。
We develop a theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact, and compare the impact of different platform ownership structures. If two-sided network effects are strong, monopoly ownership induces more trade than dispersed ownership and is therefore socially preferable. Independent of the strength of network effects, monopoly ownership dominates a club-like ownership structure where incumbent owners can exclude potential entrants. Under dispersed ownership, vertical integration tends to increase welfare as it allows the internalization of demand externalities. Allowing incumbent platform owners to exclude potential entrants hurts buyers but can raise welfare.