Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices
分析信息不对称下企业边际成本变化对价格的影响，发现知情企业成本上升反而可能降低均衡价格，适用于信贷、保险、劳动力等市场。
We present an analysis of competition under asymmetric information where prices react asymmetrically to changes in firms' marginal costs. When one firm has private information about some customers, an increase in an uninformed firm's marginal cost leads to a price increase, as usual. However, an increase in the informed firm's marginal cost causes the equilibrium price to fall by improving the distribution of customers served by the uninformed firm. The model applies to settings where information asymmetries are important determinants of competition, such as credit, insurance, labor markets, or for the sale of goods where repeat business is important. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.