选择性反报价

Selective Counteroffers

Journal of Labor Economics · 2006
被引 36
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

构建了一个企业选择性使用反报价的模型,分析影响企业发出反报价净价值的因素,并通过实证检验这些因素是否确实影响企业对有竞争性报价的员工考虑反报价的可能性。

Abstract

The existence of counteroffers can lead to a variety of important labor-market features. This article develops a model of the selective use of counteroffers in which a firm decides whether to extend counteroffers after a worker informs the firm of an alternative offer. We outline factors that can influence the employer's net value of making a counteroffer and, thus, affect the likelihood of a counteroffer. We provide a new empirical analysis that examines whether proxies for these factors do, in fact, influence the likelihood that a firm would consider a counteroffer to an employee with a competing offer.

选择性反要约劳动力市场雇主决策员工留任