Corporate watchdogs
研究了金融分析师作为企业看门狗的角色，发现受分析师密切监控的公司更可能被美国证券交易委员会调查或成为证券集体诉讼的对象，且这种效应并非分析师迫使高管不当行为所致。
Abstract We investigate the role of financial analysts as corporate watchdogs. We show that firms that are subject to intense analyst monitoring are more likely to be investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or to be the subject of a securities class action. Using cross‐sectional variations in managerial entrenchment, we find that this effect is not a reflection of the “dark side of analyst coverage,” analysts pushing executives to misbehave to exceed short‐term expectations. Our findings are robust to different identification strategies addressing the endogeneity of analyst coverage decisions.