Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like Ceos? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China
通过中国农村的随机实验，研究了对学校管理者的绩效激励（奖励减少学生贫血）与自由支配资源之间的互补性，发现大额激励有效但会被资源挤出。
Abstract Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.