Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
证明，公开信息减少信息不对称能通过提高证券流动性吸引大投资者需求，从而降低公司资本成本；但初始信息不对称较大时，减少不对称会提高当前价格，而最大当前价格出现在信息不对称存在时。
This paper shows that revealing public information to reduce information asymmetry can reduce a firm's cost of capital by attracting increased demand from large investors due to increased liquidity of its securities. Large firms will disclose more information since they benefit most. Disclosure also reduces the risk bearing capacity available through market makers. If initial information asymmetry is large, reducing it will increase the current price of the security. However, the maximum current price occurs with some asymmetry of information: further reduction of information asymmetry accentuates the undesirable effects of exit from market making.