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坚持高利率:金融危机、道德风险与利率政策

Holding out for a haircut: financial crisis, moral hazard, and interest rate policy

International Journal of Finance and Economics · 2000
被引 0
ABS 3

中文导读

研究了国际货币基金组织在危机经济体中推行高利率政策的争议,指出高利率可激励企业快速债务重组,避免债务停滞的坏均衡,对政策制定者和经济学家有参考价值。

Abstract

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prescribed introduction of higher interest rates in crisis-hit economies has been criticized as being unnecessarily contractionary. This criticism ignores the effects of interest rate policy on the incentives to restructure corporate debt once it has become strategically optimal for domestic firms to declare a state of over-indebtedness. A widespread state of debt moratoria constitutes a ‘bad’ equilibrium, whereas the widespread adoption of a quick debt workout strategy is a potentially ‘good’ equilibrium. The latter can be encouraged through various policies, most controversially a short-term policy of high interest rates. Other potential policies include: (i) widespread debt forgiveness; (ii) enhanced implementation of the bankruptcy court; and (iii) the enforcement of free market competition. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

金融危机道德风险利率政策企业债务重组破产