The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Wage Negotiations
研究了企业和工会仅就工资进行谈判时Kalai-Smorodinsky讨价还价解的特征，发现当就业工资弹性和工会风险规避均为常数时，该解与Nash解存在简单关系。
AbstractThis paper characterizes the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution when firms and unions negotiate over wages alone, and firms set the level of employment in order to maximize profits given the agreed wage. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is analysed for the case that the wage elasticity of employment and the union's risk aversion are both constant. In this case there is a simple relationship between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and the Nash solutions.Keywords: Industrial RelationsManpower PlanningGame Theory