Growth Opportunities and Risk-Taking by Financial Intermediaries
发现，金融中介在财务困境中无法变现的增长机会（Gz）是决定其风险选择的关键因素；Gz占总资产比例低的机构更可能孤注一掷。该模型重新评估了传统监管措施的有效性，并提出了新的检查思路。
We show that growth opportunities which cannot be converted to cash under conditions of financial distress ( G z ) are a critical determinant of an intermediary's choice of risk. Financial institutions in which G z is a low proportion of total assets will be much more likely to engage in go-for-broke behavior. The model leads to a reevaluation of the effectiveness of several traditional remedies for dealing with banks that take excessive risks such as raising insurance premiums, intervening before capital is depleted, and restricting investment options. The model also has implications about a new approach to the examination of financial intermediaries.