Welfare, Child Support, and Strategic Behavior
研究福利政策下父母如何策略性规避正式子女抚养费，发现较高的抚养费命令和较低的忽略额与更少的正式抚养费命令相关。
Abstract Qualitative research has documented strategic behavior in response to child support policy. Parents of children on welfare have an incentive to avoid formal child support, since most states limit the amount of formal child support that women on welfare can receive (the “disregard”) and have relatively high child support orders for low-income fathers. This paper develops a simple model to make several predictions about how the disregard and order might interact to influence formal child support orders. Using data from the CPS-CSS merged with state child support variables, I find some evidence that higher orders and lower disregards are associated with fewer child support orders.