Approval Voting
回顾了批准投票的历史与性质，发现真诚投票时它比多数规则和波达规则更能反映选民意愿；策略投票时它避免了其他规则可能出现的反常结果，并推广了中位选民定理。
Under approval voting, a voter may cast single votes for each of any number of candidates. In this paper, the history of approval voting and some of its properties are reviewed. When voters vote sincerely, approval voting compares favorably with both the plurality rule and Borda's rule in yielding outcomes reflective of the electorate's will. When voters vote strategically, perverse outcomes possible under other rules cannot arise at equilibrium under approval voting. Well-known ‘median voter’ results in two-candidate positioning games generalize to multicandidate settings under approval voting but not under the plurality rule.