Extortion
研究了有组织犯罪团伙对生产性企业的敲诈勒索行为，发现其主要危害是长期侵蚀和扭曲生产，并可能导致财产破坏；还发现警察保护增加可能反而刺激敲诈活动。
Extortion of productive enterprises (‘shops’) by organized crime groups (‘gangs’) takes place in virtually all economies. We develop a framework to study this activity. The main harm of extortion comes from the long‐run erosion and distortion of useful production, as well as from the destruction of property that we show can occur in equilibrium. Among other results, we also find: gangs may increase their activity in response to increased police protection; often, but not always, forward‐looking gangs induce lower resource waste than myopic gangs.