Inefficiency due to tenancy protection: a new tenure problem in Taiwan
研究发现，受租佃法规保护的固定租金佃农长期效率可能低于自耕农和非正式佃农，尤其当农业收入非其主要家庭收入来源时；租佃改革并非提升农业效率的万能药。
ABSTRACT Fixed‐rent tenancy was traditionally regarded as equally efficient as owner‐cultivators. The counter‐example is, however, presented here. Specifically, tenants with fixed‐rent contracts and well protected by tenancy regulations may, in the long run, turn out to be less efficient than other farmers (e.g., owner‐cultivators and informal tenants), particularly when they do not heavily depend on farm revenue as major source of family income. On the other hand, tenants who are not benefited from tenancy regulations might not be less efficient than owner‐cultivators. The underlying implication is tenancy reform is not a panacea for improving farming efficiency; it may result in many negative effects in the long run.