Evidence of Discrimination in Lending: An Extension
扩展了Ferguson and Peters (1995)的模型，允许多数和少数借款人在违约时回收率不同，发现统一信贷政策会导致跨群体交叉补贴，且利润最大化贷款政策可能使少数借款人平均违约率更低。
We generalize the model of Ferguson and Peters (1995) to allow for unequal recovery rates in the event of default by majority borrowers versus minority borrowers. This simple extension has two direct implications: (i) a uniform credit policy, as defined by Ferguson and Peters, entails cross-subsidization across groups; and (ii) it is possible for a profit-maximizing (and therefore economically nondiscriminatory) lending policy to generate lower average default rates among minority borrowers than among majority borrowers.