Managerial Miscalibration*
基于超过13,300个预期股市回报概率分布的十年面板数据，发现高管严重校准偏差：实际市场回报仅36%落在其80%置信区间内，且偏差在高不确定性时期更严重，校准偏差的高管所在公司投资更多、债务融资更多。
Abstract Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives’ 80% confidence intervals only 36% of the time. We show that executives reduce the lower bound of the forecast confidence interval during times of high market uncertainty; however, ex post miscalibration is worst during periods of high uncertainty. We also find that executives who are miscalibrated about the stock market show similar miscalibration regarding their own firms’ prospects. Finally, firms with miscalibrated executives seem to follow more aggressive corporate policies: investing more and using more debt financing.