Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century
研究J.P.摩根合伙公司与其客户企业的关系如何缓解外部融资问题，通过比较摩根关联公司与非关联公司的投资回归方程，发现非关联公司面临流动性约束。
This article presents evidence suggesting that the relationship that existed between the partnership of J. P. Morgan and its client firms partially resolved the latter's external financing problems by diminishing the principal-agent and asymmetric information problems. I estimate and compare investment regression equations for a sample of Morgan-affiliated companies and a control group of nonaffiliated companies. The econometric results seem to indicate that companies not affiliated to the House of Morgan were liquidity constrained.