Coalitional Rationalizability*
研究非合作博弈中联盟如何通过迭代限制策略集实现集体利益，定义了一种非空联盟理性化策略集，类似迭代剔除劣策略但基于联盟隐性协议。
This paper investigates how groups or coalitions of players can act in their collective interest in noncooperative normal form games even if equilibrium play is not assumed. The main idea is that each member of a coalition will confine play to a subset of their strategies if it is in their mutual interest to do so. An iterative procedure of restrictions is used to define a noncooperative solution concept, the set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies. The procedure is analogous to iterative deletion of never best response strategies, but operates on implicit agreements by different coalitions. The solution set is a nonempty subset of the rationalizable strategies.