Myopic Agency
研究动态委托代理中代理人隐藏长期与短期行动选择的最优契约，发现基于连续高产记录的分层奖励结构，并对比传统偷懒模型，为奖金改革争论提供理论依据。
I consider a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the agent repeatedly chooses between hidden long-term and short-term actions. Relative to the long-term action, the short-term action boosts output today but hurts output tomorrow. I explicitly characterize the optimal contract that always induces the long-term action. It features a cliff-like arrangement that rewards high output today based on the streak of consecutive high outputs the agent has generated leading up to today: The longer the streak, the larger the reward. The optimal contract can be implemented as a bonus bank. Bonus banks feature prominently in the recent debate on bonus reform. I shed light on the opposing arguments driving this debate by formally comparing the myopic agency optimal contract and optimal contracts that arise from traditional effort-shirking agency models.