Gender differences in the ultimatum game
研究最后通牒博弈中男女行为差异，发现提议者性别不影响出价，但男性回应者获得更高出价，且双方对女性提议者要求更高最低接受价，导致收入差异，对薪资谈判有启示。
I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players’gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the gender of player 1. Offers are affected by the gender of player 2, with men attracting higher offers, particularly from female players 1. Players 2 of both genders choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when facing a female player 1. These patterns led to substantial differences in earnings. Such striking differences in expectations and decisions could impact salary negotiations and other real-world transactions.