The Limits of Monetary Coordination as Exchange Rate Policy
分析了货币政策协调稳定汇率的假设，发现其仅在部分情况下成立，且政治可行性存疑；同时以美元升值对制造业就业的影响为例，说明汇率波动并非净损失。
PROPOSALS FOR COORDINATION of monetary policy to stabilize nominal or real exchange rates or for targeting monetary policy on the nominal exchange rate assume, explicitly or implicitly, that exchange rate fluctuations are, on balance, harmful to the world economy and that monetary policy can productively reduce the amplitude of these fluctuations.The objective of this paper is to examine the analytical basis and empirical evidence for these assumptions.The conclusion is that both hold only some of the time.A coordination agreement would therefore have to define the circumstances under which the assumptions hold, a difficult task indeed.A third assumption in current proposals for a formal international conference to implement a coordination agreement-a " new Bretton Woods '-is that such an agreement is at least politically feasible.This assumption too is questionable.Toward the end of the paper I will argue that any international conference held now would resemble the failed World Economic Conference of 1933 far more closely than it would Bretton Woods.Movements in the real exchange rate of the dollar have had substantial effects on employment and output in U.S. manufacturing industries.The elasticity of employment to an appreciation in the real dollar exchange rate is -0.14.Thus a real 60 percent appreciation of the dollar from 1980 to 1985 would, in itself, have reduced manufacturing employment by 8.4 percent, or 1.7 million jobs.However, even this magnitude of job loss is not a net loss to the economy, because the real dollar appreciation was part of an equilibrium reaction to the shift in the structural budget position in the early 1980s.The real appreciation