专利救济

Patent Remedies

American Economic Review · 2016
被引 46
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了美国混合专利救济制度(财产规则与责任规则结合)对发明和新产品开发激励的影响,区分了专利权人与侵权者是否为竞争对手的不同情形。

Abstract

Since the Supreme Court's eBay decision in 2006, the U.S. has employed a hybrid patent remedy system that mixes property and liability rules. When the patent owner and the infringer are competitors, the courts typically issue a permanent injunction requiring the infringer to cease its infringing activities. In contrast, when the patent owner and the infringer are not competitors, the courts often allow the infringer to continue its infringing activities so long as it pays specified ongoing royalties to the patent holder. This article studies the incentives for invention and for new product development in such a hybrid system.

专利救济混合制度永久禁令持续许可费