Progressive Learning
研究了动态委托代理关系中，委托人通过渐进学习代理人私人信息来提升自身价值，甚至可能实现长期最优收益，这与棘轮效应文献中委托人持续低收益的结论形成对比。
We study a dynamic principal–agent relationship with adverse selection and limited commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the principal may be able to improve her value over time by progressively learning the agent's private information. She may even achieve her first‐best payoff in the long run. The relationship may also exhibit path dependence, with early shocks determining the principal's long‐run value. These findings contrast sharply with the results of the ratchet effect literature, in which the principal persistently obtains low payoffs, giving up substantial informational rents to the agent.