Toward a Reconstruction of Keynesian Economics: Expectations and Constrained Equilibria
构建了一个两期临时均衡模型，重点分析经济主体对未来约束的预期如何影响当前均衡，并引入理性约束预期概念，说明其反而增强了政府政策的有效性。
A two-period model of temporary equilibrium with rationing is presented, paying particular attention to agents' expectations of future constraints. It is shown that with arbitrary constraint expectations many different types of current equilibrium may be consistent with the same set of (current and expected future) wages and prices, and that constraint expectations exhibit "bootstraps" properties (e.g., a higher expectation of Keynesian unemployment tomorrow increases the probability that it will prevail today). In addition, the concept of rational constraint expectations (i.e., perfect foresight of future constraints) is introduced and shown to enhance rather than reduce the effectiveness of government policy.