Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
研究了信息披露如何影响公司治理，发现过度披露可能加剧代理问题和高管薪酬成本，从而降低企业价值，并解释了强制披露增加与CEO薪酬及离职率上升的关系。
ABSTRACT Public policy discussions typically favor greater corporate disclosure as a way to reduce firms' agency problems. This argument is incomplete because it overlooks that better disclosure regimes can also aggravate agency problems and related costs, including executive compensation. Consequently, a point can exist beyond which additional disclosure decreases firm value. Holding all else equal, we further show that larger firms will adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms and firms with better disclosure will employ more able management. We show that mandated increases in disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO compensation and CEO turnover rates.