Imperfect competition and quality signalling
研究企业在价格竞争中，通过价格传递质量信号如何影响不完全竞争。低质量企业总偏好信息不完全环境，高质量企业在高价值市场中也偏好之，并探讨了消费者损失增加反而可能有利于低质量企业的反常现象。
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated substitute products. Incomplete information about vertical quality (consumer satisfaction) signalled via price softens price competition. Low-quality firms always prefer the incomplete information game to the full-information analog. Moreover, for high-value markets with a sufficiently high proportion of high-quality firms, these firms also prefer incomplete information to full information. We find that an increase in the loss to consumers associated with the low-quality product may perversely benefit low-quality firms; we consider applications to tort reform and professional licensing. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.