Labor tying
研究竞争性农业经济中劳动绑定的现象，发现尽管季节性波动和不完善信贷市场应使绑定合同占主导，但印度经验显示其呈下降趋势，模型解释为事后偏离隐性契约导致临时工市场持续活跃。
We study labor-tying in a competitive agricultural economy. The co-existence of seasonal fluctuations in income and imperfect credit markets suggests that tied contracts should dominate casual labor markets. However, empirical observation from India suggests that this is far from being the case, and indeed, that there is a declining trend in labor tying. We consider a model that permits deviations ex-post from mutually agreed implicit contracts. In equilibrium, casual labor markets are always active despite the presence of seasonality, and a variety of implications are derived that link economic growth, changing information flows, and the decline of labor tying over time.