Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital
建立模型分析银行通过监控借款人提高贷款收益，在监管和竞争融资下银行有出售贷款的动机，但道德风险限制了出售规模，并给出了缓解该问题的最优合同设计，解释了银行购买贷款的原因及近期贷款销售增长的原因。
This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral-hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank-loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral-hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.