Towards evolutionary game models of financial markets
概述了早期和近期的演化博弈模型，这些模型包含对金融市场建模有用的思想，并重点介绍了自适应景观方面的最新工作。通过一个扩展例子，展示了交易者行为分布服从Burgers偏微分方程的变体，解涉及行波激波，并推测金融市场的崩溃可以类似地建模。
Evolutionary game models analyse strategic interaction over time; equilibrium emerges (or fails to emerge) as players/traders adjust their actions in response to the payoffs they earn. This paper sketches some early and some recent evolutionary game models that contain ideas useful in modelling financial markets. It spotlights recent work on adaptive landscapes. In an extended example, the distribution of player/trader behaviour obeys a variant of Burgers' partial differential equation, and solutions involve travelling shock waves. It is conjectured that financial market crashes might insightfully be modelled in a similar fashion.