Comments on the Willingness of an Economic Agency to Pay for Parallel Research Efforts
分析了风险中性的决策者为并行研究策略付费的意愿，基于管理科学中信息价值的文献，考察了付费意愿与研究结果统计矩的关系，并计算了付费意愿的上界。
An analysis of the willingness of a risk-neutral decision-taker to pay for a parallel research strategy is undertaken. The results, which are based on the management science/operational research literature about the value of information, examine the relationship between this willingness to pay and the statistical moments of the distribution of research outcomes. Only the benefits are considered in studying the above-mentioned problem in a non-traditional economic approach. More precisely, the case of the winner-takes-all is studied to evaluate the willingness to pay for a parallel strategy rather than for a non-parallel one. Upper bounds on the willingness to pay are computed and analysed with respect to the distribution of research outcomes.