Optimal Capacity Mechanisms for Competitive Electricity Markets
研究了竞争性电力市场中容量机制的最优设计，发现批发价格上限与容量支付的组合能引导社会最优投资，并解释了可再生能源渗透率提高时容量支付的必要性。
Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. This paper introduces a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different conventional generation technologies. We consider two policy instruments, a wholesale price cap and a capacity payment, and show which combinations of these instruments induce socially-optimal investment by the market. Our analysis yields a rationale for a capacity mechanism based on the internalization of a system-cost externality—even where the price cap is set at the value of lost load.In extensions, (i) we show how increasing variable renewables penetration can enhance the need for a capacity payment under a novel condition called “imperfect system substitutability”, and (ii) we outline the socially-optimal design of a strategic reserve with a targeted capacity payment.