CORPORATE CHARTERING: AN EXPLORATION IN THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL CHANGE
研究了19至20世纪初美国各州公司注册法从特许制向一般法转变的规律，发现法律变革最先发生在利益最大且游说成本最低的州，说明法律创新与经济创新遵循相同的成本收益逻辑。
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the market for corporate charters was deregulated as states replaced special chartering with incorporation under general laws. This paper explores the pattern of deregulation across states within the context of the interest‐group theory of government. The empirical results show that legal change tended to occur first in states where the stake in deregulation was greatest, and where the costs of lobbying for “liberal” corporation codes were low. Innovations in law can thus be explained by the same benefit‐cost calculus that describes economic innovation.