DISCOUNT PRICING
研究了商家将价格标为折扣（如“原价200，现价100”）如何影响消费者购买意愿，分析了质量信号、清仓销售和参考依赖偏好三种机制，并讨论了虚假折扣的监管福利效应。
We investigate the practice of framing a price as a discount from an earlier price, with information such as “was $200, now $100.” We discuss two reasons why a discounted price—rather than a merely low price—can make a consumer more willing to purchase. First, a high initial price can indicate the seller has chosen to supply a high‐quality product. Second, when a seller with limited stock runs a clearance sale, later consumers infer that unsold stock has higher expected quality when its initial price was higher. We also suggest a behavioral explanation, which is that consumers with reference‐dependence preferences are more likely to buy if they perceive the price as a bargain relative to the earlier price. Discount pricing is therefore an effective marketing technique, and a seller may wish to deceive potential customers by offering a false discount. The welfare effects of regulation to prevent fictitious pricing are subtle, with potential unintended consequences, and depend on whether consumers are sophisticated or naive.