Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm
研究了私人信息导致经理人间讨价还价低效率的问题，分析了最优所有权结构如何最小化这种低效率，发现联合所有权在预期交易收益大时最优，一体化或非一体化在收益小时最优。
Private information can lead to inefficient bargaining between managers. I develop a property rights theory of the firm to analyze the optimal ownership structure that minimizes this bargaining inefficiency. I first show that a change in the ownership structure that reduces the managers' aggregate disagreement payoff increases the probability that they realize efficient trades, but also increases the cost of disagreement and can lead them to trade “too often.” I then show that joint ownership is optimal if the managers' expected gains from trade are large and that either integration or nonintegration is optimal if the expected gains from trade are small.