Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing
提出基于公司控制权考虑的资本结构理论，认为最优债务水平平衡了被收购概率的降低与目标股东获得更高协同份额的权衡，并推导出杠杆率与收购概率、股东收益分配等关系的四个推论。
A capital structure theory based on corporate control considerations is presented. The optimal debt level balances a decrease in the probability of acquisition against a higher share of the synergy for the target's shareholders. This leads to the following implications: (i) the probability of firms becoming acquisition targets decreases with their leverage, (ii) acquirers' share of the total equity gain increases with targets' leverage, (iii) when acquisitions are initiated, targets' stock price, targets' debt value, and acquirers' firm value increase, and (iv) during the acquisition, target firms' stock price changes further; the expected change is zero and the variance decreases with targets' debt level.