Financing Experimentation
研究了企业家在需要向贷款人融资时进行实验学习自身能力的过程，发现当实验更有利可图时融资反而更难，并证明内生抵押品要求是最优契约的一部分。
Entrepreneurs must experiment to learn how good they are at a new activity. What happens when the experimentation is financed by a lender? Under common scenarios, i.e., when there is the opportunity to learn by “starting small” or when “noncompete” clauses cannot be enforced ex post, we show that financing experimentation can become harder precisely when it is more profitable, i.e., for lower values of the known arm and for more optimistic priors. Endogenous collateral requirements (like those frequently observed in microcredit schemes) are shown to be part of the optimal contract.