Monitoring experts
研究了如何设计合同激励专家收集信息并如实报告给决策者，假设转移支付不能依赖于实现的状态或事后收益，通过让专家相互监控来降低实施成本，并刻画了最优合同的性质。
We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to “monitor each other” by making the transfers contingent on the entire vector of reports. We characterize the least costly contract that implements any given vector of efforts and derive the cost function for the decision maker. We then study properties of optimal contracts by comparing the value of information and its cost.