ASCAP versus BMI (versus CBS): modeling competition between and bundling by performance rights organizations
建立了一个表演权组织（PRO）之间使用一揽子许可证进行竞争的模型，发现当竞争PRO数量较少时，一揽子许可证会提高PRO利润并增加音乐作品使用者的成本，同时解释了为何在无监管的PRO市场中仍存在一揽子许可证。
Building has been a long-standing issue in industrial organization. In recent years, bundling has gained renewed controversy as it has been employed by computer software manufacturers. This article examines BMI v. CBS (1979), which dealt with bundling by performance rights organizations (PROs). A model of competition between PROs using blanket licenses is presented. The usage of blanket licenses is shown to generate both higher profits for PROs and higher costs for the users of musical compositions when there are a small number of competing PROs. In addition, the model explains why blanket licenses are observed in unregulated PRO markets. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.