Money and Information
研究生产者对商品质量有私人信息时货币的作用。货币促进高质量生产、改善福利，但当高质量生产者比例内生时，货币可能因给低质量生产者提供消费保险而降低福利，且货币均衡中信息成本更高。
This paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply. When the fraction of high-quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously. When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, which can result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium. Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange, but not because it saves information costs. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.