Global Budgets and Excess Demand for Hospital Care
提出一个理论，解释为何采用全球预算支付医院护理的医疗体系普遍存在过度需求，并指出医院管理者控制预算分配，追求自身效用最大化，导致均衡护理量低于消费者需求，甚至预算增加可能加剧过度需求。
Excess demand is a pervasive feature of health care systems that use global budgets to pay for hospital care, regardless of the amount of money spent by those systems. This paper presents a theory that explains this feature of global budgets. The theory emphasizes that hospital administrators control the allocation of their budget, and that they choose quantity and resource intensity to maximize their own utility. The equilibrium quantity of care provided may be less than quantity demanded by consumers, leading to excess demand for admissions. An increase in the hospital's budget may even be associated with an increase in excess demand. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.