Persuading Voters
研究政治家如何通过设计政策实验（公共信号）影响选民投票，发现简单多数规则下多数选民可能受损，并分析选民为何偏好超级多数或一致同意规则以促使政治家提供更信息丰富的实验。
In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a nonunanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment.