Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: a Game-Theoretical Perspective: a Comment
评论了Frantz和Walker（1997）的博弈模型，指出其不披露均衡结果虽技术正确，但未捕捉现实工资谈判的关键因素，不过该模型展示了分析方法对员工信息披露讨论的价值。
In this comment we identify the key features of the Frantz and Walker (1997) game theoretic model that drive the non-disclosure equilibrium result in their paper. We argue that, although technically correct, their model fails to capture certain aspects of real-world wage bargaining that will be important in determining optimal disclosure strategies in practice. However, Frantz and Walker's paper illustrates the potential of analytical techniques to contribute to the employee disclosure debate.