实地蜈蚣博弈

Field Centipedes

American Economic Review · 2009
被引 128
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

通过实地实验发现,国际象棋高手在蜈蚣博弈中多数立即停止,与以往实验证据相反;当高手与学生对弈时,结果趋近于子博弈完美均衡。

Abstract

In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that 69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

蜈蚣博弈实地实验国际象棋大师子博弈完美均衡