Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings: An Asymmetric Information Approach
假设投资者与寻求股权融资的企业之间存在信息不对称，推导出三种股权融资形式同时存在的均衡：高质量企业采用备用配股，中等质量企业通过未保险配股的认购价传递信号，低质量企业则选择承销发行。
By assuming asymmetric information between investors and firms seeking new equity, we derive a rational expectations, partially revealing information equilibrium in which three forms of equity financing are observed. The highest quality firms employ a standby rights offers, intermediate quality firms signal their true value in the choice of a subscription price in an uninsured rights offer, while low-quality firms remain indistinguishable to investors by making fully underwritten issues. The model offers justification for many firms using apparently more costly underwritten offers, provides a reason why firms using uninsured rights offers do not set arbitrarily low subscription prices to ensure the success of the issue, and explains the simultaneous existence of the three financing vehicles.