Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
研究发现，多数外部董事兼任三个及以上董事职位的忙碌董事会与弱公司治理相关，表现为更低的市场账面比、盈利能力及CEO更替对业绩的敏感度，且忙碌独立董事离职带来正向异常回报。
ABSTRACT Firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate governance. These firms exhibit lower market‐to‐book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Independent but busy boards display CEO turnover‐performance sensitivities indistinguishable from those of inside‐dominated boards. Departures of busy outside directors generate positive abnormal returns (ARs). When directors become busy as a result of acquiring an additional directorship, other companies in which they hold board seats experience negative ARs. Busy outside directors are more likely to depart boards following poor performance.