An Industry Equilibrium Analysis of Downstream Vertical Integration
研究了产品替代性如何影响双头垄断市场中制造商选择直营店还是特许经销商的均衡分销结构，发现低替代性时倾向直营，高竞争性时倾向分散分销。
This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on Nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer, which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store. Static linear demand and cost functions are assumed, and a number of rules about players' expectations of competitors' behavior are examined. It is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure. For low degrees of substitutability, each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store; for more highly competitive goods, manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system.