The Effect of Disability Insurance on Health Investment
研究个人是否会因金钱激励而主动检测潜在疾病，利用美国退伍军人事务部将糖尿病列为可补偿残疾的政策，发现该政策使退伍军人确诊糖尿病比例上升3.1个百分点。
Abstract I examine whether individuals respond to monetary incentives to detect latent medical conditions. The effect is identified by a policy that deemed diabetes associated with herbicide exposure a compensable disability under the Veterans Benefits Administration’s Disability Compensation program. Since a diagnosis is a requisite for benefit eligibility, and nearly one-third of diabetics remain undiagnosed, the advent of disability insurance may have encouraged the detection of diabetes among the previously undiagnosed population. Evidence from the National Health Interview Survey suggests that the policy increased the prevalence of diagnosed diabetes by 3.1 percentage points among veterans.