Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms
研究了1980-1985年间80家连续亏损的纽交所公司如何调整股利政策，发现多数公司减少股利，且半数以上在减少时面临债务契约约束；管理者更倾向于减少而非取消股利，尤其是有长期股利历史的公司。
This paper studies the dividend policy adjustments of 80 NYSE firms to protracted financial distress as evidenced by multiple losses during 1980–1985. Almost all sample firms reduced dividends, and more than half apparently faced binding debt covenants in years they did so. Absent binding debt covenants, dividends are cut more often than omitted, suggesting that managerial reluctance is to the omission and not simply the reduction of dividends. Moreover, managers of firms with long dividend histories appear particularly reluctant to omit dividends. Finally, some dividend reductions seem strategically motivated, e.g., designed to enhance the firm's bargaining position with organized labor.